FICPI welcomes a more proportionate approach, although questions remain over implementation

The EPC does not require formal concordance. Description adaptation is necessary only where an unresolved inconsistency causes non-compliance with an identified EPC requirement.

Introduction

On 3 September 2026, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office issued its decision in G 1/25 on the circumstances in which a description, including any drawings, must be brought into line with amended claims1.

The Enlarged Board rejected the proposition that every difference between the claims and the description requires amendment. Instead, adaptation is necessary only where an inconsistency has legal significance because it causes non-compliance with a substantive requirement of the European Patent Convention. The EPC does not require amendment merely to achieve formal concordance between the claims and the description2.

This conclusion substantially addresses the practical concerns raised by FICPI in its amicus curiae submission. We had urged the EPO and its Boards of Appeal to refrain from requiring the deletion of unclaimed subject-matter and claim-like clauses merely because they were no longer covered by the claims. We emphasised that such amendments can impose substantial work and cost, may remove technically valuable disclosure and can create risks under Articles 83 and 123 EPC3. 

The outcome is therefore broadly positive for users of the European patent system. However, it does not abolish description adaptation. It changes the question that examining divisions, opposition divisions, Boards of Appeal, applicants and proprietors must address. The issue is no longer simply whether the description and claims differ, but whether that difference creates a legally relevant inconsistency under the EPC.

 

The referral

G 1/25 arose from opposition appeal proceedings concerning European patent No. 2 124 521, based on European patent application No. 07704142.4 and entitled “Hydroponics Growing Medium”. The patent proprietor was Knauf Insulation and the opponent was ROCKWOOL A/S4.

The referring Board had found the claims of an auxiliary request to satisfy the requirements of the EPC but considered that paragraphs [0013] and [0016] of the description were inconsistent with an amended claim. A further amended description filed during the appeal proceedings was not admitted because it was filed late5.

The Enlarged Board was asked whether an inconsistency introduced by an amendment to the claims during opposition proceedings requires adaptation; which EPC provisions provide the legal basis; and whether the answer differs in examination proceedings6.

The referral arose against two diverging lines of Board of Appeal case law. One treated Article 84 EPC as a basis for requiring consistency. The other, represented particularly by T 1989/18, T 1444/20, T 2194/19 and T 56/21, considered that Article 84 does not establish a general obligation to remove unclaimed material from the description7.

FICPI’s position before the Enlarged Board

FICPI filed an Amicus Brief on 6 November 2025. Our central position was that the presence of unclaimed subject-matter in the description does not, by itself, constitute an inconsistency requiring amendment. Article 84 EPC requires the claims to be supported by the description. It does not require the description to be supported by the claims or establish a one-to-one correspondence between them9.

We accepted that amendment may be needed where the description expressly indicates that unclaimed subject-matter is covered by the claims, for example by describing it as “according to the claim” or “according to the claimed invention”. We also distinguished that situation from retaining an embodiment, example or technical teaching outside the amended claims10.

Our brief highlighted the practical consequences of routine adaptation. Deleting or disclaiming every element not reflected in the final claims can be difficult and costly. Material removed as supposedly unclaimed may contain information relevant to sufficiency or claim interpretation. Indiscriminate amendment could therefore weaken, rather than improve, a patent11.

These concerns reflected FICPI Resolution EXCO/FR22/RES/002, adopted in Cannes in September 2022. The resolution urged the EPO not to insist on removal unless the material clearly contradicted the claims and cast doubt on the extent of protection12.

We proposed that the first referred question should be answered “No” where the alleged inconsistency consisted only of unclaimed subject-matter remaining in the description, and that the same approach should apply in all proceedings13.

The Enlarged Board’s answer

The Enlarged Board did not adopt FICPI’s proposed answer in its entirety. It held that adaptation can be required, but rejected any automatic or general requirement to achieve formal agreement between claims and description.

The decision states that where a claim amendment introduces an inconsistency and that inconsistency causes non-compliance with Articles 52 to 57, 76(1), 83, 84, 123(2) or 123(3) EPC, the description and any drawings must be adapted to remove it14.

The legal basis is not a free-standing rule of description adaptation. It is the particular EPC provision with which the application or patent fails to comply because of the inconsistency. Adaptation is therefore a means of curing a specific substantive defect, not an independent formality15.

A narrow definition of inconsistency

An inconsistency exists where one or more statements in the description or drawings suggest an understanding of a claim that is incompatible with the apparent meaning of that claim, and the incompatibility cannot readily be resolved by applying G 1/24. There must be real doubt as to the claim’s meaning when read by the skilled person in the context of the application or patent as a whole16.

Crucially, an inconsistency is not established merely because the description or drawings contain technical teachings, examples or embodiments outside the claimed subject-matter. Such material becomes problematic only if it creates uncertainty over whether it falls within the claim or otherwise causes non-compliance with an EPC requirement17.

This closely aligns with FICPI's principal concern. The decision gives applicants and proprietors a strong basis for resisting blanket requests to delete embodiments, recast them as prior art or label them “not according to the invention” solely because they are not covered by the current claims.
 

Article 84 EPC and G 1/24

We argued that Article 84 EPC operates in one direction: the claims must be supported by the description, rather than the description being supported by the claims. The Enlarged Board did not accept that analysis as an absolute proposition.

The Enlarged Board considered that decisions adopting a strictly “one-way street” interpretation relied on the premise that claim clarity is assessed without reference to the description. That premise could no longer be maintained following G 1/2418.

The description and drawings must always be consulted when interpreting the claims. This is a unitary, holistic interpretative exercise, not a sequential process in which the claim is first assessed in isolation19.

At the same time, Article 84 EPC does not require purely formal concordance or removal of all matter not reflected in the claims. It becomes relevant where an inconsistency makes it unclear whether information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments fall within the claim20.
 

Other EPC provisions

An inconsistency may affect patentability under Articles 52 to 57 EPC. The Enlarged Board gave the example of a claim amended for inventive step where the description retains a conflicting technical teaching corresponding to the pre-amendment claim. If that statement materially affects interpretation, it must be removed21.
The order also refers to Articles 76(1), 83, 123(2) and 123(3) EPC. The Enlarged Board nevertheless described possible issues under those provisions as more theoretical than practical and expected them rarely, if ever, to arise22.
 

Examination and opposition proceedings

The interpretative role of the description and drawings does not depend on procedural stage. The same principles apply in examination, examination appeal, opposition and opposition appeal23.

The Enlarged Board treated amendment of the claims and consequential adaptation as parts of the same procedural step. It noted that descriptions are generally finalised at oral proceedings before a Board and that nothing in G 1/25 called for a change in that practice24.

Adapting the description while appeal proceedings remain pending was described as generally more efficient than remittal, which might lead to a further appeal25.


We had proposed that an applicant or proprietor should always receive at least one opportunity to amend the description after an allowable claim set was identified. The order does not incorporate that safeguard, although the procedural observations may assist where a consequential amendment is alleged to be a separate late change.
 

FICPI’s assessment

From FICPI’s perspective, G 1/25 represents a welcome and substantial move towards a more proportionate approach. The Enlarged Board did not accept that no EPC provision could require adaptation, nor the strict “one-way street” interpretation of Article 84. However, it accepted the practical core of FICPI’s position:


• There is no autonomous requirement for formal adaptation of the description.
• Unclaimed embodiments or technical teachings do not, by themselves, constitute an inconsistency.
• The EPC does not require formal concordance.
• Adaptation is justified only where a concrete inconsistency causes non-compliance with an identified EPC provision.
• The inconsistency needs to be removed or neutralised only to the extent necessary to restore compliance.

 

The decision therefore places the focus where FICPI considered it should be: on legally meaningful contradictions, not editorial perfection26.
 

Practical implications for FICPI members

Applicants and proprietors now have a principled basis for asking the EPO to explain any request for adaptation by reference to:

• the precise statement said to be inconsistent;
• the understanding of the claim allegedly suggested by that statement;
• why that understanding is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the claim;
• why the incompatibility cannot readily be resolved through G 1/24; and
• the particular EPC requirement that is not met as a result.

This framework follows from the Enlarged Board’s definition of inconsistency and its requirement for substantive non-compliance27.

Where a genuine inconsistency exists, the response should be proportionate. It may be removed or neutralised by amending the claims, description, drawings or a combination of them. A targeted wording change may avoid deleting an entire embodiment28.

Applicants should review proposed description amendments carefully. Because G 1/24 requires the description and drawings to be consulted when interpreting the claims, changing the description may affect the meaning attributed to the claims. FICPI also identified potential risks under Articles 83, 123(2) and 123(3) EPC 29, 30.
 

Conclusion

G 1/25 does not eliminate adaptation of the description. It rejects the proposition that a description must be edited merely because amended claims no longer cover every disclosed embodiment.

The decision establishes a functional test. Adaptation is required only where an unresolved inconsistency has legal significance under a particular EPC provision. Unclaimed subject-matter may remain where it does not create such a problem.

We welcome the rejection of purely formal concordance and the recognition that compulsory editing must have a substantive legal justification. The practical value of the decision will depend on consistent implementation by examining divisions, opposition divisions and the Boards of Appeal. This is something we will work on with the EPO, through our membership of SACEPO and its sub-committees and bilateral meetings.
 

Endnotes

1. Enlarged Board of Appeal, G 1/25, decision of 3 September 2026, case G 0001/25, appeal T 0697/22-3.3.02, datasheet and p. 1.
2. G 1/25, Reasons, “The meaning of ‘inconsistency’” and “Conclusions on adaptation of the description”, pp. 13-19, especially point 43.
3. FICPI, Written Statement for Case G 1/25 before the Enlarged Board of Appeal, 6 November 2025, section II.5, pp. 6-8.
4. G 1/25, datasheet and decision, pp. 1-3.
5. G 1/25, Summary of Facts and Submissions, points II-VI, pp. 2-3.
6. G 1/25, Summary of Facts and Submissions, point I, p. 1.
7. G 1/25, Summary of Facts and Submissions, points VII-XVII, pp. 3-8.
8. FICPI, Written Statement, introductory section and section I, p. 1.
9. FICPI, Written Statement, section II.3, pp. 3-6.
10. FICPI, Written Statement, section II.2, pp. 2-3.
11. FICPI, Written Statement, section II.5, pp. 6-7.
12. FICPI, Resolution EXCO/FR22/RES/002, “Compulsory Amendment of Description and Drawings”, Cannes, 25-29 September 2022, pp. 1-2.
13. FICPI, Written Statement, section III, p. 8.
14. G 1/25, Order, p. 22.
15. G 1/25, Answers to the Questions, pp. 20-21.
16. G 1/25, Reasons, “The meaning of ‘inconsistency’”, pp. 12-13.
17. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
18. G 1/25, Reasons, “Interpretation of Article 84 EPC”, pp. 15-16.
19. G 1/25, Reasons, “The relevance of decision G 1/24 to the present referral”, pp. 10-12.
20. G 1/25, Reasons, “Inconsistency and Article 84 EPC”, pp. 16-17.
21. G 1/25, Reasons, “Inconsistency and Articles 52 to 57 EPC”, pp. 17-18.
22. G 1/25, Reasons, “Further Articles of the EPC and inconsistencies”, pp. 18-19.
23. G 1/25, Reasons, “Question 3”, p. 12.
24. G 1/25, Reasons, “Obiter remarks: when to amend the description”, p. 19.
25. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
26. G 1/25, Reasons, pp. 13-19 and Order, p. 22; FICPI, Written Statement, sections II.2, II.3 and III, pp. 2-8.
27. G 1/25, Reasons, “The meaning of ‘inconsistency’” and “Conclusions on adaptation of the description”, pp. 12-19.
28. G 1/25, Reasons, “The meaning of ‘inconsistency’”, pp. 13-14.
29. G 1/25, Reasons, “The relevance of decision G 1/24 to the present referral”, pp. 10-12.
30. FICPI, Written Statement, section II.5, pp. 6-7.

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